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1.1  Introduction 
An important determinant of the optimal setting of any (second-best) tariff 
policy is the degree to which the supply side of  the economy can respond to 
the imposition of the tariff. This follows from the fact that a tariff  is both a 
subsidy to producers and a tax on consumers of the import good, and therefore 
distorts two decisions. Thus, for instance, if  a tariff  is used  to address an 
existing production distortion, the optimal tariff setting will come closer to 
free trade the less are resources able to respond to the tariff  (the smaller the 
marginal impact of  the tariff  on the existing production distortion). Alterna- 
tively, if  a tariff is imposed to address an existing consumption distortion, its 
optimal setting will come closer to completely eliminating the consumption 
distortion the less are resources able to respond to the tariff  (the smaller the 
production distortion it  induces on the margin). In  the presence of  a trade 
distortion (the case of  a large country), the optimal tariff  will be higher the 
less are resources able to respond to the tariff  (the lower the foreign import 
demand elasticity). And if a tariff is used to redistribute income, not only the 
costs of  distorted production but, as is well known from Stolper-Samuelson 
and specific factors results, the redistributional impacts of the tariff  as well 
may depend crucially on the ability of productive resources to respond. 
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All this suggests that governments may behave very differently when  set- 
ting tariff levels depending on the degree to which the supply side of the econ- 
omy  is in  a position to respond to the actual policy choice. An  important 
determinant of the magnitude of this response is the timing of the government 
decisions relative to those of  the private sector or, to put  it differently, the 
freedom with which the government can reoptimize once private decisions are 
made. In particular, resources that can move after observing the government 
policy action can condition their sectoral location decision on the observed 
tariff  choice. On the other hand, resources that move simultaneously with or 
before the government tariff choice must base their decisions on the expected 
(rather than actual) policy; the sectoral allocation of  these resources is then 
taken as given by the government when it chooses a tariff  level. The greater 
the government’s opportunities to reoptimize, the greater is its degree of pol- 
icy discretion relative to the private sector, and the greater is the proportion of 
factors that base their decisions on the expected government action, lowering 
the government’s overall assessment of  supply responsiveness when making 
its tariff decision. 
Of course, in a repeated setting those factors of production that move prior 
to or simultaneously with the government tend to base their allocation deci- 
sions on expected tariff  actions that  turn  out in equilibrium to be  correct: 
hence, the government does not in fact find it possible to exploit the timing of 
its decisions to surprise the private sector. On the contrary, unless the govern- 
ment can credibly bind itself to a tariff policy which is not ex post optimal, its 
timing “advantage” will turn into a liability: the government loses control of 
the private sector’s expectations and remains tra.pped in  a suboptimal time- 
consistent tariff equilibrium. 
It is this logic that underlies much of the recent literature on the efficacy of 
rules versus discretion in  trade policy.  For example,  Staiger and Tabellini 
(1987) have analyzed the costs of  policy discretion when a government at- 
tempts to use tariffs as a redistributive tool. Lapan (1988) has characterized 
the equilibrium when a large country attempts to impose its optimal tariff in a 
discretionary policy regime. And Staiger and Tabellini (1989) argue that, be- 
cause of the second-best nature of most trade policy intervention, the issue of 
credibility is likely to be an important determinant of the extent as well as the 
efficacy of trade policy in most environments. 
In addition to the small body of theoretical literature on credibility and trade 
policy, there is a large amount of work on rules versus discretion in macroeco- 
nomic policy, generated by the seminal paper of Kydland and Prescott (1977). 
However, as is true of all the work on rules versus discretion, this literature is 
almost exclusively theoretical.  This is a serious omission, given the very 
sharp normative implications of this debate for actual policymaking. It is per- 
haps this omission that explains why some economists have suspended their 
1. Recent exceptions are Judd (1989) in public finance, Romer (1989) for monetary policy, and 
Edwards and Tabellini (1990) for monetary and fiscal policy. 13  Rules vs. Discretion in Trade Policy 
judgment on the relevance of  these issues, or have de fact0 ignored them in 
their research on economic policy. 
In this paper we test empirically for evidence that trade policy depends on 
the degree of government discretion. We do this by studying government tariff 
choices in two distinct environments. One environment is that of  tariffs set 
under the escape clause (section 201 of the U.S. Trade Act of  1974). We argue 
that these decisions afford the government with ample opportunity to reopti- 
mize and with correspondingly little ability to commit. The other environment 
is the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations and the determination of the set of 
exclusions from the general formula cuts. We  argue that these decisions pro- 
vided the government with a much diminished opportunity to reoptimize and 
with a correspondingly greater ability to commit. Comparing decisions made 
in these two environments allows us to ask whether different degrees of policy 
discretion have a measurable impact on trade policy decisions. 
While we explore the effects of discretion in trade policy within the context 
of the escape clause, we feel that the issue is of much broader interest, espe- 
cially in light of the recent literature on trade policy in the presence of imper- 
fect markets. While much of this literature is concerned with various condi- 
tions under which activist trade policies are warranted, taken together the 
results of the literature suggest a second, more subtle, implication: The new 
activist trade policy, if it is to be pursued at all, must be pursued with discre- 
tion, judging each situation on a case by  case bask2  As such, the current 
debate over the appropriate degree of activism in trade policy is unavoidably 
a debate over the appropriate degree of policy discretion as well. The results 
of our empirical analysis should thus be relevant to this broader debate. 
The next two sections set out in some detail the theoretical framework dis- 
cussed informally above. Section 1.4 motivates our empirical approach. Sec- 
tion  1.5, which describes the escape clause and Tokyo Round tariff-setting 
environments, argues that a crucial difference between the two is the degree 
of government discretion. We  discuss the data and present our empirical find- 
ings in  section 1.6 and present our conclusions in section 1.7. Data sources 
are described in the appendix. 
1.2  Credibility and ’Itade Policy 
1.2.1  The General Framework 
In this section we  formalize the argument that the timing of tariff-setting 
decisions relative to private sector decisions matters. We begin by abstracting 
2. For instance, Dixit (1987) concludes: “The current median view of the profession in this 
matter can be fairly characterized as (i) a recognition that the existence of imperfect competition 
does modify or overturn some conventional beliefs about trade policy, and (ii) an awareness that 
the design of policy to fit each situation requires close attention to its specific details. This suggests 
that research should be directed  toward improving our understanding of the realities of  some 
industries that are likely candidates for strategic trade policies.’’ 14  Robert W.  Staiger and Guido Tabellini 
from distributional  issues and consider a one-consumer economy within the 
general framework laid out by Dixit (1985). Our purpose here is to illustrate 
that the potential for credibility problems in trade policy is widespread.  The 
next section focuses in detail on trade policy motivated by redistributive goals 
and derives the main testable implications of our theory. 
Consider first a small open (one-consumer) economy that faces a given vec- 
tor of world prices, r, and has exogenous domestic consumption and produc- 
tion distortions.  The role of trade policy is to offset these distortions.  Let the 
consumption and production distortions be summarized by the vectors a  and 
p, respectively, and let T be a vector of specific tariffs. Then, the relationship 
between domestic prices, world prices, distortions, and tariffs can be written 
as 
(1)  p  = r + T  + a, 
(2)  q = r + T  + @, 
where p and q denote consumers’ and producers’ prices (in terms of a numer- 
aire commodity). Let E( 1  ,p,u)  be the expenditure function, with the numer- 
aire good labeled by  zero and its price normalized  to unity, and with u the 
consumer’s utility  level. We assume for simplicity that all goods are traded. 
Define T(  1 ,q) as the profit function with the same convention about the nu- 
meraire. Profits are assumed to be taxed at 100 percent so that consumer and 
producer prices can be independently normalized. All tax and tariff revenues 
are returned to the consumer lump sum. Using standard properties of the ex- 
penditure and profit functions, the equilibrium balanced trade condition can 
be written as 
(3)  E, -  T,  + Y . (E, - TJ  = 0 
where subscripts denote derivatives. 
Our timing assumptions are as follows.  First sector  i chooses a supply re- 
sponse to the vector of expected tariff choices of the government T~.  Next, or 
simultaneously with sector i’s choice, the government commits to its vector of 
tariffs  T. Then, after observing T, sector  i is permitted  a dampened supply 
response to the difference between actual and expected tariffs, with the elastic- 
ity of sector i’s ex post (after T is observed) supply curve being (1 -  +,)  E[O, 11 
of its ex ante (before 7  is observed) elasticity. All consumption decisions are 
made after the government tariffs are in place. Thus, +, parameterizes the in- 
flexibility of sector i’s supply decisions relative to the policy decisions of the 
government. If +, = 0, all supply decisions are made after observing the gov- 
ernmental choice. In this case, the government can enter into binding policy 
commitments and there  is  no  credibility  problem.  In the opposite extreme 
case, +t  = 1, all supply decisions are made before observing the policy, and 
the ex post supply response is zero. More generally,  1 > +, >  0, in which case 
the ex ante and ex post supply responses differ. Accordingly, the ex ante and 
ex post optimal policies also differ. 15  Rules vs. Discretion in Trade Policy 
Naturally,  in equilibrium the expected tariff  T~ coincides with the ex post 
optimal policy, and the government fulfills those expectations. In the literature 
on rules versus discretion,  this equilibrium policy has been called the “time- 
consistent” policy, or the “discretionary” policy. Throughout this section we 
will simply call it the equilibrium policy, to emphasize that it is the optimal 
government  response  under  a  particular  assumption  about  the  timing  of 
moves. 
Differentiating (3) and using (1) and (2) provides the key relationship from 
which the equilibrium tariff is determined.: 
(4)  (Eou + r  *  Epu)du= (a  + T)‘EppdT 
where for simplicity + is taken to be a square diagonal matrix with ith diago- 
nal element +8, and f is the identity matrix of  the same dimension. Through- 
out, primes will be used to denote transposes. 
Under these timing assumptions,  the government takes the expected tariff 
as given (dTe = 0) when  it sets policy:  The expected tariff only matters for 
those production decisions  that have already been  made (and hence can no 
longer be altered) when the actual policy is determined. Moreover, in equilib- 
rium policy  surprises are ruled out (T  = v). Thus, the equilibrium (ex-post 
optimal) policy is determined by 
(5)  (Eou + r  - Epp)du  = (a  + T)’EppdT -  (p + T)‘(f -  +)nqqdT. 
The coefficient on the left-hand side of (5) is the income effect on all com- 
modities, and it can be shown to be positive. Hence, the change in utility as 
tariffs are changed has the same sign as the right-hand side of (5). The terms 
Epp  d7  and rqq  dT  on the right-hand side denote the consumption and produc- 
tion substitution effects, respectively. Hence, the two terms on the right-hand 
side reflect the welfare effect of moving consumption  and production  when 
there are distortions or tariffs. 
According to equation (5),  the equilibrium policy depends on the matrix + 
that parameterizes the degree of government discretion relative to that of pri- 
vate producers.  The traditional case considered  in the literature on optimal 
trade policy is a special case of (5): it corresponds to + = 0, in which case the 
ex ante and ex post optimal policies coincide (i.e., the government can pre- 
commit in advance of all productive decisions). We now turn to a characteri- 
zation of  the equilibrium tariff response to production and consumption dis- 
tortions when +, is allowed to vary between 0 and 1 for all i. 
1.2.2  Production Distortions 
-  (p + T)’[T99d7e  + (f -  +)IT~,(~T -  dV)], 
Consider first the use of  tariffs to address a production distortion (p #  0, 
a = 0).  The equilibrium tariff  is given, using (5),  by the solution to 16  Robert W.  Staiger and Guido Tabellini 
or 
(7) 
Thus, the equilibrium tariff policy is affected by the timing of the govern- 
ment move. In particular, if $ = 0 so that no supply-side decisions need be 
committed until after the government tariff choice is observed, then (7) coin- 
cides with the traditional expression for the optimal tariff in the presence of a 
production distortion (e.g., see Dixit 1985). At the other extreme, if + = Z  so 
that all supply-side decisions must be made prior to or simultaneously with 
the government, the actual tariff set by the government will have no impact on 
the production distortion once expectations are given, and the equilibrium has 
= 0: the tariff  will  be  completely  ineffective as a policy  tool  to correct 
production distortions. 
1.2.3  Consumption Distortions 
Consider next the existence of consumption distortions. This corresponds 
to the case where a # 0 and P = 0. The equilibrium tariff  is given, using 
(3,  as the solution to 
(8) 
du  -&  = O  = [E,,  + r .  ~,,]-l[(a  + +)’E~,  - ?(z -  +)7rqq] 
or 
(9) 
Again,  the equilibrium tariff  is affected by  the timing  of  the government 
decision. If the government has no opportunity to surprise the supply side of 
the economy (9  = 0), the equilibrium tariff coincides with that prescribed by 
the theory of optimal taxation (see again Dixit 1985). At the other extreme, if 
the government moves after all supply-side decisions have been made ($ = 
Z),  then all production distortions introduced by the tariff will be ignored by 
the government in equilibrium,  and ? =  -a’:  The equilibrium tariff com- 
pletely eliminates the consumption distortions. 
1.2.4  Terms of  Trade 
Finally, consider the case of a large country wishing to exploit its monopoly 
power in trade and unconcerned about the possibility  of retaliation. For sim- 
plicity we assume that the matrix + applies both domestically and in the rest 
of the world. The large country analogue to equation (4) is 
(10) 
if  = -  a’Epp[Epp  - (Z -  +)7rJ1. 
(EOu  + r.  E,,)du  = (T + a)’EPp[dr  + d~] 
-  (T + P)’[IT,,(~F + d~)  + (Z -  +)7rqq((dr  + d~) 
-  (dF +  -  m  *  dr, 17  Rules vs. Discretion in Trade Policy 
where m  is the vector of net imports from the rest of the world, and where the 
world price vector r is determined by 
(11)  E  - ,.,.  = =row  -  E:"", 
P  4  r 
with nrow  and Emw the profit and expenditure functions, respectively, for the 
rest of the world. The large country analogue for (5) is then 
(12)  (Eou + r  EJdu  = (a  + T)'EPp(dr  +dT) 
-  (p + T)'(I  -  +)n,(dr  +d~)  -  m  *  dr 
with 
dr = [(Epp  + Qw)  -  (I - +)(nq4  + n;w)]-'{[(I  - 
+)nP4  -  Eppld7- [Epu  + E?"ld.>. 
A trade distortion is represented by the condition dr # 0, a = 0, and p = 0. 
The equilibrium tariff is given using (1  2) by the solution to 
du 
-  = 0, 
dT 
which after manipulation yields 
(14)  .;'  = rn'[(Z  - *)Try -  E5'. 
As before, the equilibrium tariff vector for a large country is affected by the 
timing of government moves, and will in general be higher the greater is the 
proportion of  resources that  must  allocate prior  to or simultaneously with 
the government tariff decision (the closer Q  is to r) (see also Lapan 1988). 
1.2.5  Discussion 
These three instances of  equilibrium trade policy lead to the same broad 
conclusion. In equilibrium, the degree of discretion in government decisions 
relative to that of the private sector has a profound impact on the chosen tariff 
policies. In particular, the greater the government's degree of discretion rela- 
tive to the private sector, and therefore the greater the fraction of  resources 
that move prior to, or simultaneously with, it (the closer + is to I), the smaller 
will be the assessment of factor supply responsiveness ([I - +Inqq)  implicit 
in the government's  tariff choice. Naturally, the allocation of  productive re- 
sources fully reflects the government policy even if  the government moves 
after some productive decisions have been made. In other words, both the 
expected and the actual policy matter. However, in equilibrium the govern- 
ment does not take into account the effects of expected policies, but only those 
of actual policies. This discrepancy, between what the government takes into 
account and the overall effects of the (actual and expected) policy, increases 
with the extent of  government discretion (i.e.,  with +). Hence, the welfare 18  Robert W.  Staiger and Guido Tabellini 
properties of the equilibrium depend on the extent of government discretion: 
the larger is the degree of discretion,  the less the government takes into ac- 
count the full effects of the policy and, ceteris paribus,  the lower is social 
welfare. For this reason, policy discretion can be counterproductive. 
1.3  Credible 'lkade Policy and Income Distribution 
We now study trade policy motivated by redistributive goals. As argued in 
the next section, the observed policy interventions that we exploit in our em- 
pirical test largely reflect this motivation. The model of this section general- 
izes Staiger and Tabellini  (1987), to which  we refer  the  reader for a more 
detailed investigation of credible trade policy in this framework. 
1.3.1  The Model 
Consider a small open economy with two traded goods and two inputs to 
production,  labor, and capital. Capital is immobile across sectors, and tech- 
nology  is homogeneous of degree 1  in both inputs. To simplify notation, we 
assume that both  sectors share the same production function, and that each 
sector is endowed with one unit of  capital. The production technologies are 
given by 
(15)  i =  f(NI),  i = x,y,  f'(*) > 0,  f"(.) < 0, 
where NI =  labor employed in sector i;  x =  exported good; and y = imported 
good. 
In each sector, firms combine labor with their fixed stock of capital, up to 
the point where the value of labor's marginal product is equated to the nominal 
wage measured in terms of any numeraire, W: 
(16)  Pf'(Nx)  = w;  P  (1 + t)f'(NI)  = W' 
where P  is the world price of the exported good, t is the ad valorem tariff on 
imports, and Pj  is the world price of  imports. Wages are assumed to be per- 
fectly flexible so that equation (16) yields the nominal  wage that clears the 
labor market in each sector. 
Throughout this section, we consider the reaction of private agents and of 
the government to a shock that lowers the world price of good y.  To simplify 
notation, let PX =  1 and let Py  be the post-shock  realization of the price of 
good y. 
The aggregate supply of labor in the economy as a whole is assumed fixed 
and equal to N.  Labor is mobile between sectors and reallocates in response 
to the shock on the basis of  the expected intersectoral wage differential.  We 
contrast  equilibrium  trade  policy  under  two  opposite  timing  assumptions. 
Under discretion, the government sets policy after all the workers in sector y 
have chosen whether or not to reallocate to the other sector based on the ex- 19  Rules vs. Discretion in Trade Policy 
pected wage differential. By  (16), the expected wage differential subsequent 
to the shock but prior to the policy action is 
Under commitment, the timing is reversed: first the government irrevocably 
commits to  a tariff. And  then all the workers, having observed the policy, 
choose whether or not to reallocate from y to x based on the actual wage dif- 
ferential. In this case the actual wage differential is defined as in (17) with t 
replacing te.  Consumption decisions are always made after the government 
policy is in place. 
A crucial assumption of  the model  is that  labor's intersectoral mobility 
comes only at a cost. Specifically,  we assume that, whenever one unit of  labor 
moves from one sector to the other, its marginal product falls by the fraction 
(1 -  A),  1 >  A >  0. These moving costs differ across individuals: the param- 
eter A is distributed uniformly on the unit interval across workers. 
Consider the regime with discretion. Here, workers must make their sec- 
toral allocation decision before observing the government action. Any worker 
for which A > Wye/Wxe  finds it optimal to reallocate from y to x. Let b  = Wye/ 
Wxp  be the marginal worker, who is just ex ante indifferent between reallocat- 
ing or not. It can be shown that ie  is an increasing function of  the expected 
tariff,  te. Intuitively, a higher expected tariff  reduces the relative wage differ- 
ential in sector x. Hence only the low moving-cost (high A)  workers find  it 
optimal to reallocate. Similarly, consider the regime with commitment, and 
let  = Wy/Wx  be the marginal worker who is ex post indifferent between 
relocating or not (i.e., after the tariff is in place). It can be shown that A is an 
increasing function of the actual tariff, t. The intuition is the same as above. 
Under either regime, equilibrium requires that t = te, and hence L = b. 
Based on this notation, and the assumption that A  is uniformly distributed 
in the population, we can write the fraction of workers who remain in sector y 
as i  under commitment and ie  under discretion, respectively. To  simplify the 
analysis, we express labor in efficiency units. Thus, the effective quantity of 
labor employed in each sector once the adjustment to the shock is completed 
is given by 
Nx = NG  + Ng  -AdA = & + (1 -  A2)/2. 
(19)  I,' 
where N; is the initial employment in sector i. 
The remainder of  the model is straightforward and is identical to that in 
Staiger and Tabellini (1987). Specifically, let I be national disposable income 
valued at domestic prices. Imposing the condition of balanced trade at world 20  Robert W.  Staiger and Guido Tabellini 
prices, abstracting from domestic taxes, and assuming that the tariff is nonpro- 
hibitive, it follows that, subsequent to the shock, 
(20) 
where the tariff revenue T is defined by 
(21)  T = t[Cy -  f(Ny)]Py, 
Cy being aggregate demand for the imported good y.  Substituting (21) into 
(20), national income valued at domestic prices is given by 
(22) 
I  = f(N") + Py  (1 + t)f(Ny) + T, 
I  =  ANX) + Py  If(Ny) + tCy]. 
To focus on the redistributive consequences of tariffs for the labor allocation 
decision, we assume that the distribution of  income is determined solely on 
the basis of the wage differential between the two sectors. Thus, income from 
capital and tariff revenues is distributed to each worker in proportion to the 
share of  his labor income in the economywide wage bill. Define the income 
share variable, cp, as 
I' 
(23)  'pi  = 7 = WYW  i = x,y,yX, 
where W is the average wage rate, P is total disposable income of a worker of 
the ith type (valued at domestic prices), and the superscripts x, y, and yX de- 
note workers originally in sector x  who remain there, workers originally in 
sector y  who remain there, and workers of  type X  originally in sector y  who 
move to sector x, respectively. Using the previous notation, and recalling that 
WyA = AW, the average wage rate W under commitment is 
%W  + NgWY  [X + (1 - L2)/2] 
lv 
(24)  W= 
Under discretion, the average wage rate is defined as in (24) with b  replac- 
ing X. 
Each worker consumes a bundle of x and y, chosen to maximize an identical 
homothetic utility function, subject to a standard budget constraint. The indi- 
rect utility function of a representative consumer of the ith type can be written 
in terms of the previous notation as 
(25)  v = V(Px,Py,P),  i = x,y,yX. 
Letting V; and V;  denote the partial derivatives of (25) with respect to PY and 
P,  respectively, the consumption of y on the part of consumers of the ith type 
can be expressed, using Roy's identity, as 
V; 
v; 
C-Y= - -  = cpQ,  i = x,y,yX. 21  Rules vs. Discretion in Trade Policy 
The second  equality follows  from the  assumption  that  the common utility 
function is homothetic. 
Finally, the government is assumed to care about the three types of workers 
in proportion  to their frequency  in the population.  However,  we allow the 
relative weights in the government objective function to be affected by politi- 
cal considerations, which we represent by the parameter ay. Thus, under com- 
mitment the government maximizes: 
j  (1 -  c@)N;Vx + wVN;)?Vy + ayN;  WdA  i,' 
or, with normalization, 
J = yVx + )?Vy +  VyAdA, 
(27)  i' 
where y = [(  1 -  CLY)/CP]  "y,.  Under discretion the government maximizes 
a function analogous to (27), except that )? is replaced by I..  Note that a value 
of  CUY  =  '/2  would correspond to a utilitarian social welfare function, while 
CP > '/2  (ay < 1/2) implies that workers in sector y  receive relatively  greater 
(lower) weight  in the government decision. The determinants  of  CXY  will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
We assume the absence of any market mechanisms for reallocating the risk 
associated  with the terms-of-trade  shock. If  such private insurance markets 
existed and worked perfectly, there would be no role for government interven- 
tion in the form of protection in our model.3 
1.3.2  Equilibrium under Commitment 
This subsection derives the equilibrium trade policy when the government 
can commit. Since the results here and in the next subsection form the basis 
for our empirical work, we impose the simplifying assumption of logarithmic 
utility to ensure a reasonably simple form for the equilibrium tariff. The first- 
order conditions for a government optimum are 
where we have 
The second equality  in (29) follows from (26). The first term on the right- 
hand side of  (29) captures the direct redistributive effect of the tariff on the ith 
individual. The remaining terms capture the effect on the ith individual's wel- 
fare due to the consumption and production distortions of the tariff. 
3. See Eaton  and Grossman (1985) for a defense of this assumption and  Dixit (1989) for a 
criticism of it. 22  Robert W.  Staiger and Guido Tabellini 
After some simple algebra, we have4 
where qy  is the elasticity of output supply in sector y.  By the assumption that 
the workers' utility function is logarithmic, 
Combining (29),  (30)  and (31),  we obtain 
dV  1  dcpi  PYt 
-  [CY  + Yq'l.  dt  cpi dt  (1 + t)I 
Moreover, in equilibrium Vy  = VyA by definition of i.  Hence, combining (32) 
and (31),  we can rewrite the government first-order conditions as 
dX  1  dv 
cpx  dt 
(33) 
The left-hand side of (33)  is the marginal benefit of protection, taking the form 
of redistribution from high- to low-income workers. The right-hand side is the 
marginal cost of the tariff, net of tariff revenues, due to production and con- 
sumption distortions. At the optimum, the marginal benefit and the marginal 
cost of the tariff must be equal. 
To  complete the description of  the equilibrium, it remains to discuss the 
effect of the tariff on the distribution of income. By (23)  and (29),  after some 
simplifications, 
(34)  9  - - --<<;-  cp'cp"  di  dcp'  = (1 -  ~  ky  ) (p'->o;  di 
dt  l+hdt  dt 
- 
l+h  dt 
where h =  NIN; and the signs follow from dildt > 0. Thus, a tariff redistrib- 
utes in favor of those who remain in the injured sector. Intuitively, if workers 
were to reallocate from y to x based on the expectation of no protection sub- 
sequent to the shock, then a surprise tariff  would leave this labor allocation 
unaffected and would raise the value of  labor's marginal product in sector y 
directly by  raising the domestic price of  y; this, in turn, would increase Wy 
relative to W. However, in equilibrium, workers are not surprised by the gov- 
4.  Equation (30) has been derived from equations (22), (19), and (18) and by  exploiting the 
definition of  A and the assumption of  a logarithmic utility function. 23  Rules vs. Discretion in Trade Policy 
ernment action, so that this redistributive effect is partially offset by  the fact 
that fewer workers will leave the injured sector y subsequent to the shock, 
knowing that protection is forthcoming. Nevertheless, since moving costs (1 
- A)  differ across individuals by  assumption, and since workers choose to 
leave the injured sector y in ascending order of moving costs (descending or- 
der of  A),  the fact that fewer workers leave sector y as a result of  the tariff 
implies that the marginal worker who is just indifferent between staying in y 
and moving to x corresponds to a higher value of  A as a result of the govern- 
ment's tariff response (formally, d)?ldt > 0). Hence in equilibrium the tariff 
succeeds in raising Wv/Wx, (which equals A) despite the induced effect on the 
allocation of labor.5 
Combining (33) and (34) and simplifying, we obtain the equilibrium tariff 
under commitment: 
(35) 
where S = [(l + h(1 -  c~.)/ay)/(l  + h)]  is a weight that reflects the govern- 
ment distributive goals, q"  is the elasticity of the equilibrium wage differential 
with respect to the tariff, My is imports of y, and qMy  is import demand elastic- 
ity taken positively. It can be shown that qw  5  1: as noted above, the redistrib- 
utive effects of protection are partially offset by the induced smaller realloca- 
tion of labor. The greater is labor mobility, the smaller is dxldt, and as a result 
the smaller is the elasticity q". Note also that a government maximizing a 
utilitarian social welfare function (a  = Y2) would correspond to S  = 1, so 
that income equality (preserving the  status quo) is  the government's goal. 
However, if ay  > Y2  (cu' < Y2), then S < 1 (8 > 1) and the government prefers 
income to be distributed unequally in favor of  sector y (the rest of the econ- 
Equation (35)  conforms with intuition. The numerator refers to the mar- 
ginal benefits of  protection, in the form of  income redistribution, which en- 
hance government welfare. The marginal benefits of protection are higher the 
larger is the fraction of employment in the injured sector, NVN,  the greater is 
ay,  the weight placed on the utility of an injured-sector worker, the greater is 
the extent of  injury (the lower is cay),  and the greater is the elasticity of  the 
wage differential with respect to the tariff q"  (because the greater is the redis- 
tributive impact of trade protection). The denominator refers to the marginal 
production and consumption distortions of the tariff, captured by the elasticity 
of import demand, qMy, weighted by the import share of national income. The 
greater these distortions, the smaller is the equilibrium tariff. Finally, for con- 
omy). 
5. In this respect, the model differs from that  of Staiger and Tabellini (1987). who assume a 
single value of A for all workers and hence conclude that under commitment trade policy cannot 
affect the wage differential across sectors; in that model, the direct effects of the tariff are exactly 
offset by the induced smaller reallocation of labor from y to x. 24  Robert W.  Staiger and Guido Tabellini 
venience in comparing the optimal tariff under commitment to that under dis- 
cretion, we note that the assumption of logarithmic utility allows the denomi- 
nator of the right-hand  side of (35) to be written equivalently as (PyMy/Z)+ 
= (PyCy/Z)(  1 + uqy)  where uy  is the ratio of output to consumption in sector 
y.  With this, we rewrite (35) as 
1.3.3  Equilibrium under Discretion 
We next derive the trade policy implemented when the government cannot 
commit. In this case, labor allocates based on the expectation of the tariff, and 
prior to observing the actual policy. Hence,  when the policy is chosen,  the 
government is forced to treat the  labor allocation as given.  In terms of the 
previous notation, dbldt = 0. This has two effects on the government opti- 
mality conditions.  On the one hand, the government neglects the production 
distortions induced by  trade  policy. Repeating the previous  steps under the 
additional  constraint dbldt = 0, we can rewrite the government optimality 
condition as in (33), except that yqy disappears from the right-hand side (in- 
tuitively, the ex post output elasticity is zero,  since all production  decisions 
have been made once the tariff is implemented). On the other hand, the redis- 
tributive effects of trade policy now appear greater, since the direct effects of 
the tariff on Py  are not partially offset by the smaller reallocation of labor from 
y to x. Specifically, by (23) and (24), we can rewrite (34) as 
dqy  cpy[(l  + h) - Lp'] > 0;  *-  ((PY),  <  O;-  =  (1  + t)(l + h) 
- 
(37)  dt  (1 + t)(l  + h)  dt 
dt  (1 + t) (1 + h) 
-  - A(@)*  > o. 
~  -  dqyA 
The signs of (37) and (34) are the same. But the expressions in (37) can be 
shown to be larger in absolute value than those in (34). 
Combining (37) with the analogue of  (33) for the regime with discretion, 
we obtain the equilibrium tariff when the government cannot commit: 
which has the same intuitive interpretation as (36). 
1.3.4  Commitment versus Discretion 
We  now compare the equilibrium under discretion to that under commit- 
ment. By (38) and (36), there are only two differences. They both are due to 
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from the ex ante elasticities that matter when  the government can commit. 
First, the ex post elasticity of the wage differential is equal to unity. Hence, qw 
= 1 in (38) but not in (36). This is because if the government cannot commit, 
it sets policy after the labor reallocation is completed. Hence, the redistribu- 
tive effects of the tariff are not offset by  a smaller reallocation of  labor away 
from the injured sector, and the wage differential moves in the same propor- 
tion  as the tariff.  Second, the ex post  elasticity of  output supply is zero. 
Hence, qy  = 0 in (38) but not in (36). Again, this is because under discretion 
the government sets policy after production decisions have been made. 
Since under commitment qw  <  1 and qY  > 0, equations (38) and (36) imply 
that rd >  rc: The government provides more protection under discretion than 
under commitment. In equilibrium, however, the private sector correctly an- 
ticipates the trade policy decisions, so that any hope of actually using policy 
discretion to surprise the private sector is futile. Hence, the government wel- 
fare is higher with commitments  than under discretion, since the latter equilib- 
rium involves an  excessive amount of  protection. This and other normative 
issues are further addressed in Staiger and Tabellini (1987). 
1.4  Empirical Methodology 
In this section we discuss the framework within which our assessment of 
the empirical importance of  discretion in  the determination of  trade policy 
will be carried out. To  motivate our empiricaI methodology, we  employ the 
distributional assumption on A to rewrite the expression for the optimal tariff 
under commitment in (36) as 
(39) 
where ey  is the wage bill divided by the value of output in sector y. Comparing 
(39) with (38), the optimal tariff under commitment will lie further below its 
discretionary level the smaller is the ex ante redistributive effect of the tariff 
(qw)  and the larger the output share of  consumption (my)  and the wage bill 
share of output (W).  These last two effects can be understood by recalling that 
under commitment the government takes into account the distortionary effect 
of its policies not only on consumption decisions but on labor allocation de- 
cisions as well, and through these on production decisions, while under dis- 
cretion the government only takes into account the distortionary impact of  its 
policies on consumption decisions; hence, the greater is the importance of 
labor in output (0.)  and the greater is output relative to consumption (uy),  the 
greater is the impact of  this difference on tariff choices in the two environ- 
ments. Finally, under the assumption thatf"(.)  is sufficiently close to zero, qw 26  Robert W.  Staiger and Guido Tabellini 
takes on a value of approximately one.6  With this last simplifying assumption, 
and taking logs of (38) and (39), the optimal tariff under discretion is given by 
td 
(40)  = ~~(NvN)  + en(i - tjq) - enpcvz) 
and under commitment given by 
(41)  en __ A en(Ny/N) + en(l -  6q) -  en(PyCVI) - uW'. 
(1 :  f') 
Thus, (40) and (41) suggest a simple test for whether the degree of policy 
discretion matters; namely, to check whether the last term on the right-hand 
side of  (41), uW,  enters as a  significant  explanatory  variable  in the  tariff 
choices.  According  to our theory,  it  should have a negative  and significant 
coefficient only if the government can enter binding commitments. The next 
two sections describe how we carry out this test. 
1.5  Tariff Setting under Section 201 and the Tokyo Round 
In this section we argue that tariff decisions made under the escape clause 
and exclusions granted from formula cuts under the Tokyo Round correspond 
roughly to the model outlined in section 1.3, with the former decisions reflect- 
ing a high degree of government discretion relative to the latter. Our approach 
is to analyze decisions made in these two environments within the framework 
provided by (40) and (41) and to test for evidence that the degree of discretion 
matters in the determination of tariff policy. 
In one sense, the determination of escape-clause tariffs and the determina- 
tion  of  exclusions  from the  Tokyo Round  tariff-cutting  rules represent  the 
same conceptual  experiment.  In each case, an  initial  drop in  the domestic 
price level for a particular sector had occurred (or was expected to occur), and 
the government was faced with a decision as to how to respond to this event. 
In the case of an escape-clause decision, the initial drop in the domestic price 
level would not typically have been policy-induced  (the 1974 act dropped the 
requirement existing in the Trade Act of  1962 that trade concessions be the 
major cause of increased imports). In the case of determining Tokyo Round 
exclusions,  the (expected) price drop was a direct result of the agreed-upon 
(Swiss) tariff-cutting rule. In both cases, given the initial sectoral injury (or 
6. Explicit calculation yields the following expression for 11": 
with q"'  approaching one from below asf"(.) approaches zero. Thus, withf"(.) close to zero, the 
difference between the optimal tariff under commitment and that under discretion is due primarily 
to the perceived difference in distortions (rather than redistributive effects) brought about by  the 
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expected injury), the government was then faced with the decision of choos- 
ing a tariff response: in the case of  escape-clause action the tariff  response 
would be set directly, while in the case of  the Tokyo Round exclusions the 
tariff  response would be chosen indirectly by  setting an exclusion from the 
agreed-upon tariff reductions. In both cases, the government could anticipate 
that any action it took would be met by  reciprocal responses from foreign 
trading partners: Article XIX of the GATT provides for this explicitly in the 
context of  escape-clause actions (see Richardson  1988), while the give and 
take between governments in arriving at exclusions from the Tokyo Round 
tariff cuts is well documented (see Baldwin and Clarke 1987). 
There are, however, three potentially important differences between these 
decision-making environments.  The  first concerns differences in  the  con- 
straints under which the government operated. The second concerns possible 
differences in the perception of  the degree of permanence of  the government 
decision in each case. And the third concerns the degree of  government dis- 
cretion in each case and the timing of government decisions relative to those 
of the private sector. 
As to the first, in escape-clause decisions the government was constrained 
not to lower tariffs below their current level. This constraint was absent when 
exclusions were determined to the Tokyo Round tariff-cutting rule. In  fact, 
Baldwin and Clarke (1 987) note that during the determination process the 
United States did offer “negative exclusions” (i.e., tariff  cuts which were of 
greater magnitude than the tariff-cutting rule) on a range of  low-tariff prod- 
ucts. We  will attempt to control for this difference in the empirical work to 
follow by restricting our attention when considering the Tokyo Round exclu- 
sions to sectors in which pre-Tokyo round tariffs exceeded 5 percent.’ A re- 
lated point concerns the possibility that the government could set exclusions 
from the Tokyo Round reductions with a more general equilibrium view in 
mind than would be possible in the context of  the sector-by-sector decisions 
under escape clause actions. However, as Baldwin and Clarke (1987, 259, n. 
1) note, “The procedure for determining what items would not be subject to 
the tariff-cutting rule and what withdrawals would be made in response to the 
other countries’ exceptions was  similar to traditional item-by-item negotia- 
tion.” This suggests that general equilibrium considerations were not an im- 
portant element in the determination of  exclusions from the negotiated tariff 
reductions of the Tokyo Round. 
As to the second difference, the Tokyo Round exclusions, once set, were in 
principle not explicitly meant to be temporary, while an escape-clause action 
is in principle an explicitly temporary measure, with its termination or decline 
contemplated from year to year. However, in practice, the differences in the 
duration of  tariff responses under the two regimes is less pronounced. The 
mean duration of episodes of escape-clause protection initiated since 1975 is 
7. Baldwin (1985) adopts a similar procedure. 28  Robert W.  Staiger and Guido Tabellini 
approximately five years. The conclusion of the Tokyo Round negotiations in 
1979 marked the seventh round of  multilateral trade-barrier reductions that 
have been  negotiated under GATT auspices since  1947, implying that  the 
mean length of  time between GATT rounds is between five and six years. 
Hence, in practice, the permanence of  the government decisions which we 
consider under the two regimes is roughly equivalent. 
This brings us to the third difference in the decision-making environment, 
that of the degree of government discretion with respect to the private sector. 
It is this difference that we attempt to exploit as the basis for our empirical 
work. In particular, the negotiated tariff  reductions of  the Tokyo Round, in- 
cluding exclusions from those reductions, were completed in 1979, and were 
implemented beginning in 1980 over a period of up to eight years. Thus, the 
determination of  the exclusion from the general tariff-cutting rule was com- 
monly known by the private sector well in advance of its actual implementa- 
tion. Moreover, any government reconsideration of  these decisions prior to 
the period of “open season” renegotiation which occurred three years after the 
conclusion of  the  Tokyo  Round  required the impacted  industry to file  an 
escape-clause petition.  Since the initial filing of  a section 201  petition in- 
volves substantial cost on the part of petitioners, the government’s opportu- 
nity for reoptimization is quite limited in this setting. This in turn implies that, 
when determining the exclusions, the government would be making its tariff 
decision before the great bulk of  resources affected by  the decision would 
respond and would have limited opportunity to reoptimize once private sector 
decisions were made. 
The procedure for setting escape-clause tariffs, on the other hand, offers the 
government ample opportunity to reoptimize once private sector decisions 
have been made. Because some degree of injury must precede the filing of a 
section 201 petition that has any hope of getting to the president, many of the 
allocational decisions of  the private sector are likely to be made by  the time 
the president determines the tariff response  Moreover, escape clause tariffs 
are automatically subject to annual review, providing additional opportunities 
for the government to reoptimize conditional on private sector decisions. Even 
a presidential decision that protection is not in the national economic interest 
does not rule out a later opportunity to reoptimize; the law states that an in- 
dustry may refile the same petition with the ITC provided that one year has 
elapsed since the ITC’s previous report to the president concerning this peti- 
ti~n.~  Thus, the petitioner’s cost of refiling is small, and the opportunity for 
reoptimization on the part of the government is accordingly large. 
8. For example, in establishing the threat of  serious injury, the law instructs the ITC to consider 
evidence of  “a decline in sales, a higher and growing inventory, and a downward trend in profits, 
wages, or employment (or increasing underemployment)  in  the domestic industry concerned 
(Public Law 93-617,2  January 1975). 
9. The requirement that one year elapse since the petition was last filed can also be waived when 
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Note that this argument has nothing to do with whether escape-clause ac- 
tions have “surprised’ the private sector more or less than the tariff exclusions 
under the Tokyo Round. In fact, in our theoretical work the equilibrium policy 
involves no surprise. The question is whether, in determining the policy, the 
supply responses were taken into account by  the government equally under 
these two institutional environments. 
This discussion leads us to conclude that the most significant difference 
between the environments within which Tokyo Round exclusions and escape- 
clause tariffs were chosen appears to be the degree of discretion enjoyed by 
the government relative to the private sector. Hence, an analysis of the differ- 
ent tariff decisions made under the two regimes may provide evidence on the 
degree to which discretion matters in determining the character of trade pol- 
icy. We turn next to the data and our empirical results. 
1.6  Empirical Results 
Our empirical strategy can now be easily described. We  wish to estimate a 
version of  equation (41) for tariff  decisions made by the president under the 
escape clause and for exclusions granted from the formula cuts under the To- 
kyo Round. Our theory implies that the last variable in the right-hand side of 
(41),  uy€P, should enter negatively and significantly only in the Tokyo Round 
exclusions and not in the escape-clause decisions. Rejecting this implication 
would mean that the government has found a way to cope with the credibility 
problems of policy discretion, through reputation or otherwise. A failure to 
reject this implication, on the other hand, would suggest that reputation is not 
a good substitute for commitment and that policy discretion imposes a binding 
credibility constraint on trade policy. 
However,  in implementing this strategy we  face a difficulty: We  are not 
really committed to the assumptions about functional forms that are implicit 
in (41). Moreover, the theoretical model of section 1.3 treats as a “black box” 
the  many  political  economy  considerations  which  enter  into  our  model 
through the parameter ay  and which are likely to be important in the actual 
determination of trade policy. We deal with this problem by checking whether 
our results are robust across several alternative specifications. In particular, 
we consider a number of variations on the simple linear equation 
(42)  t = p, + pz(~vN  + p3(pycy/~  + p,(dy)  + p,r  + &, 
where r denotes a column vector of  variables that proxy for the term (1 - 
(~‘6)  in the theoretical model of  equation (41),  p,  is the corresponding row 
vector of coefficients, and E is a classical disturbance term. 
As explained in section 1.4,  the term (1 - (py6) reflects the government 
distributive goals. As a proxy we  use the extent of  injury (that is, how  far 
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ber of different political variables suggested by the existing literature on the 
political economy of trade policy. 
According to our theory, the tariff response should be larger the greater the 
fraction of  the labor force employed in the injured sector and the smaller is 
consumption of the injured sector good as a fraction of total expenditure, ir- 
respective of  whether the government can or cannot make  policy commit- 
ments. Thus, we would expect 9, to be positive, and p,  to be negative, regard- 
less of the government’s ability to commit. Moreover, and also irrespective of 
the ability to commit, we expect the tariff response to be positively related to 
the extent of injury. However, since only under commitment does the govern- 
ment take into account the distortionary effects of its policies on labor alloca- 
tion decisions and through these on production, the tariff response should be 
lower the greater is the importance of the wage bill in output and the greater 
is output relative to consumption only if the  government can commit to its 
tarif choices. We  thus expect 9,  to be negative under the Tokyo Round and 
zero under the escape-clause procedure. 
A complete listing of data sources is provided in the Appendix. While it is 
possible to obtain measures of  ad valorem exclusions from the formula cuts 
negotiated under the Tokyo Round by four-digit SIC manufacturing industry, 
presidential responses under the escape clause often take the form of quanti- 
tative restrictions. Rather than employing various elasticity measures to con- 
vert  these  to  tariff  equivalents,  we  choose simply to treat  the  president’s 
escape-clause decision as a 0/1 variable, and estimate equation (42) as a Probit 
model for escape-clause decisions. Of the forty presidential escape-clause de- 
cisions in our sample, fifteen cases ended in some form of presidential action 
(other than expedited adjustment assistance reviews, which were counted as 
no action). 
An important issue of  sample selection is raised by  the fact that the forty 
observations of  presidential escape-clause decisions in  our sample were not 
generated randomly but were instead determined by the joint requirement that 
(a)  the industry chose to file an escape-clause petition and that (b)  the ITC 
found the industry to be facing serious injury or a threat thereof. If the random 
factors influencing the decisions at either of the first two stages are correlated 
with the error term in the tariff equation (42), as they would be, for example, 
if  an  unobserved  industry  characteristic influenced  decisions at  all  three 
stages, then simple probit estimators of the coefficients of (42) will be biased 
and inconsistent. In  fact,  in a study of  ITC injury determination decisions 
relating to  escape-clause,  antidumping, and  countervailing-duty  investiga- 
tions, Hansen (1990) produced evidence of  self-selection among industries 
filing for protection; the likelihood of a positive ITC ruling was found to be a 
determinant of  the  industry decision of  whether to apply.  Nevertheless, it 
seems unlikely that sample-selection issues pose a serious problem at the pres- 
idential decision stage, since self-selection in the filing decision is presumably 
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than of a favorable presidential finding, while the ITC injury determination is 
itself logically separable from the presidential decision of  whether protection 
is in the national interest, and determinants of the ITC and presidential deci- 
sions are as a consequence likely to be distinct. Thus, we proceed to estimate 
(42) as a simple Probit model,  and postpone a more rigorous treatment of 
sample selection issues to future research. 
The explanatory variables by  sector suggested by  our theory include the 
ratio of  production worker employment to total manufacturing production- 
worker employment, the ratio of consumption to national income, and a mea- 
sure of the sectoral shock, as well as the ratio of the production-worker wage 
bill to consumption.IO As a measure of the shock for the escape-clause equa- 
tion, we try the change in the import penetration ratio and the change in the 
wage in the period leading into the presidential decision; for the Tokyo Round 
exclusion equation we use the formula tariff reduction. In addition to the ex- 
planatory variables suggested by  our theory, we consider a host of  political 
variables discussed by  Baldwin (1985). These include a measure of establish- 
ment size,  four-firm concentration ratio,  value-added share of  output, em- 
ployment, import penetration ratio, and average wage, as well as a number of 
dummies constructed to control for political differences (e.g., presidential 
party, proximity of  the decision to an election date) and cyclical differences 
(e.g., aggregate trade balance as a fraction of GNP) across escape-clause de- 
cisions. 
In estimating equation (42) for the four-digit SIC Tokyo Round exclusions, 
1978 values at the four-digit SIC level were used for all explanatory variables, 
on the grounds that this was the most recent year of data that could enter into 
decisions completed in 1979. Also since as noted in the previous section, low- 
tariff  products often received  negative exclusions as a way  of  maintaining 
deep average cuts in the face of exclusions in other sectors, we  restrict our 
sample for the Tokyo Round exclusion equation to four-digit sectors with ad 
valorem pre-Tokyo  Round tariffs greater than 5 percent. For the escape-clause 
equation,  measures of  explanatory variables were  taken  from the relevant 
four-digit SIC sector in  which the petitioning industry belonged for the year 
prior to the year in which the presidential decision was made." 
We  begin  with  estimates of  equation (42) in the context of  presidential 
escape-clause decisions. Table  1.1 presents probit results under a variety of 
10. Note that consumption here includes intermediate products, since it is constructed as sales 
minus exports plus imports. 
1 1. In particular, we do not have data tailored to the particular set of industries represented by 
each section 201 petition. While in principle such data could be collected from the published case 
reports themselves,  in practice the data published in these reports are irregular and incomplete. 
Moreover, it is not uncommon for the reports to provide four-digit SIC data when more detailed 
data are unavailable. While we plan to construct a more detailed data set in future work, it seems 
unlikely that the error introduced by using four-digit SIC data (as opposed to the specific set of 
industries within the four-digit grouping that were covered by the petition) could account for our 
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Note:  Specifications: Eq. (I): all variables in levels; eq. (2): all variables in logs, except SHOCK 
and REP201; eq. (3): PREMP,  CONS  in  logs, all other variables in levels; and eq. (4): COMMIT, 
SHOCK,  ~~~201  in levels, all other variables in logs. 
‘Dependent variable: 1 if president imposed protection, 0 otherwise. 
bSee  text for variable descriptions and differences among equations; r-statistics in parentheses. 
specifications. Of  the list of  political variables described above, five were at 
least occasionally significant, and are included in each specification listed in 
the table.  These include the import penetration ratio (IMPEN),  the ratio of 
value added to output (VALOUT), average employment per establishment as a 
measure of establishment size (ESTSIZE),  the four-firm concentration ratio for 
1976 (CONCEN), and a dummy variable that takes a value of  1 if the industry 
has previously filed a section 201 petition (~~~201).  As Baldwin (1985) notes, 
industries with  low import penetration ratios are unlikely to be viewed by 
government officials as attractive candidates for protection, implying that the 
expected sign of  the coefficient on the political variable IMPEN  is positive. 
Inclusion of the variable VALOUT is motivated by the “pressure group” model 
of  tariff  determination (Olson  1965); the smaller an  industry’s value added 
share of  output, the larger will be the percentage change in factor rewards 
associated with a given tariff change, and thus the greater the industry’s incen- 
tive to fight for protection. Thus, the expected sign of the coefficient on the 
political variable VALOUT is negative. Also, according to the pressure group 33  Rules vs. Discretion in Trade Policy 
model, variables such as ESTSIZE and CONCEN that are related to the ability of 
an  industry to internalize free-rider problems should be important determi- 
nants of industry protection. According to this argument, the coefficients on 
ESTSIZE and CONCEN are expected to be positive. However, under the “adding- 
machine” model as put forth by  Caves (1976), governments are more con- 
cerned with protecting industries composed of  a large number of small firms 
than industries which are highly concentrated, suggesting that the coefficients 
on  ESTSIZE  and CONCEN should be negative. Thus, we have no strong prior 
beliefs on the signs of these coefficients. Finally, ~~~201  is included to control 
for any repetition effect that may be present. 
The specifications presented in table  1.1 include (42) estimated in levels 
(eq. [l]), in logs (eq. [2]),  and in the form which most closely mirrors (41)- 
uyey in  levels and the remaining economic variables in logs-with  political 
variables in levels (eq. [3]) or logs (eq. [4]).  The variable SHOCK  is measured 
as the change in  import penetration ratio going into the year in  which  the 
escape-clause petition was considered. The coefficient on SHOCK is always of 
the expected sign but never significant at the 5 percent level, although it is 
occasionally significant at the 10 percent level (this is also true when SHOCK is 
measured as the change in wage). The coefficients on the political variables 
VALOUT and IMPEN are always of the expected sign and typically significant. 
The coefficients on the political variables ESTSIZE and CONCEN are typically 
negative and occasionally significant, lending some support to the adding ma- 
chine model. The coefficient on the political dummy variable ~~~201  is al- 
ways positive and typically significant, implying that industries that have pre- 
viously filed a section 201 petition have a better chance of receiving escape 
clause protection.  The coefficients on  CONS  (consumption as a fraction of 
GNP) and PREMP (production-worker employment as a fraction of total man- 
ufacturing production-worker employment) are often of  the wrong sign but 
never significant, while the coefficient on COMMIT (uW, which reduces to the 
ratio of  production-worker wage bill to consumption) is always of the wrong 
sign and occasionally significant. 
The first two columns of table  1.2 present the results of estimation when 
COMMIT is dropped from the equation, as is appropriate if escape-clause deci- 
sions are characterized by a high degree of policy discretion. The first column 
(eq. [l]) presents the equation in levels while the second column (eq. [2]) 
presents the equation in logs. Now, all coefficients take their theoretically ex- 
pected signs. In particular, the coefficients on each of the economic variables 
PREEMP,  CONS, and SHOCK take their expected signs, although only the coeffi- 
cient on PREEMP is significant. The apparent unimportance of the cost of pro- 
tection to consumers in the escape-clause decision (the insignificant coeffi- 
cient on CONS)  is consistent with the empirical findings of  other studies of 
tariff  determination and reflects perhaps a greater concern with producer as 
opposed to consumer interests in setting escape-clause tariffs. The uniformly 
poor performance of  our SHOCK measures in the escape-clause equations is not 34  Robert W.  Staiger and Guido Tabellini 
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Note:  Specifications: Eq. (1): all variables in levels; eq. (2): all variables in logs, except SHOCK 
and REP201; and eq. (3): all variables in levels. 
'Dependent variable: 1 if president imposed protection, 0 otherwise. 
bSee text for variable descriptions and differences among equations; t-statistics in parentheses. 
entirely surprising either; this may  in part reflect the fact that,  as discussed 
above,  the  ITC sends to the  president  only those petitions  associated with 
industries facing serious injury or an established threat  thereof.  Finally, the 
negative and significant coefficient on VALOUT and the generally negative but 
insignificant coefficients on ESTSIZE and CONCEN lend some support to both 
the pressure  group and adding  machine  political  economy  models  of tariff 
determination. 
In summary, under no specification do we find the coefficient on COMMIT to 
be significantly less than zero, while dropping this variable leaves us with an 
equation that conforms reasonably well to theoretical predictions. l2 We con- 
clude that presidential escape-clause decisions appear to conform to the pre- 
dictions of a model in which tariffs are set without the ability to commit. 
We turn next to analogous estimates for the exclusions to the formula cuts 
12. We also experimented with dropping variables other than COMMIT from the estimating equa- 
tion. In all specifications, the coefficient on COMMIT was never found to be significant and of the 
right sign. 35  Rules vs. Discretion in Trade Policy 
negotiated in the Tokyo Round. Here we have ad valorem exclusion measures 
for 369 four-digit SIC sectors, and can thus estimate equation (42) by  OLS 
rather than Probit. The Swiss formula for determining post-Tokyo  Round tar- 
iffs was z = (14x)l(  14 + x),  where x is the pre-Tokyo  Round ad valorem tariff 
and z is the post-Tokyo  Round tariff. Thus, for instance, a sector whose pre- 
Tokyo Round ad valorem tariff was 14 percent would, according to the Swiss 
rule, receive a seven percentage-point reduction in  its ad valorem tariff  as a 
result of the Tokyo Round. If, after exclusions, the actual tariff change emerg- 
ing from the Tokyo Round for that sector was, say, a three percentage-point 
reduction in the pre-Tokyo  Round ad valorem tariff, then the ad valorem ex- 
clusion from the (Swiss) formula cut for that sector would be four percentage 
points.  It  is this  ad  valorem exclusion-the  difference between  the  post- 
Tokyo Round tariff and the tariff that would have resulted under the Swiss 
rule-that  we use as our dependent variable. 
As mentioned above, we restrict our sample to sectors with a pre-Tokyo 
Round tariff larger than 5 percent, leaving a total sample size of 201 sectors. 
In addition to eliminating from our sample those low-tariff sectors whose neg- 
ative exclusions were used to balance the positive exclusions of other sectors, 
this also serves to provide a “minimum injury” standard associated with the 
Swiss formula cuts; all sectors in the sample faced formula tariff  cuts of  no 
less than 1.3 percentage points.13  Finally, while the most natural measure for 
SHOCK would be the Swiss formula reductions themselves, these are likely to 
be endogenous, since the formula was designed to cut high tariffs by  more 
than low  tariffs (to achieve some degree of “harmonization”), and since the 
same characteristics that lead industries to enjoy high pre-Tokyo  Round tariffs 
are likely also to enter into their ability to secure exclusions from the formula 
cuts. To  avoid this problem of  endogeneity and still make some attempt to 
control for the size of the shock, we have constructed the exclusion measure 
as a percentage of the formula reduction for that sector. As it turns out, our 
results are the same whether this measure or simply the ad valorem exclusion 
is used as the dependent variable in equation (42). Since the latter specifica- 
tion conforms more closely to earlier empirical work along these lines (see, 
e.g., Baldwin 1985), we present our results in the form of ad valorem exclu- 
sions. 
The first four columns of  table 1.3 present the results. As before, (42) is 
estimated in levels (eq. [l]), in logs (eq. [2]), and in the form which most 
closely mirrors (41) with political variables in levels (eq. [3])  or logs (eq. [4]). 
The political variables that were at least occasionally significant are the same 
as in the escape-clause estimation, except that REP201  no longer applies. 
The coefficients on the political variables VALOUT and IMPEN are always of 
the  expected sign and  often significant. While  the coefficient on  CONCEN 
is  never  significant, the  positive and  sometimes significant coefficient on 
13. While we do not present results on the full sample, they are roughly equivalent 36  Robert W.  Staiger and Guido Tabellini 
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Nore: Specifications: Eq.  (1):  all variables in levels; eq. (2):  all variables in logs; eq. (3): PREMP, 
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and eq. (5): all variables in levels. 
'.Dependent  variable: ad valorem exclusion from Swiss formula cut 
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ESTSIZE tends to support the pressure group model.  When entered as levels, 
none of  the coefficients on COMMIT, PREMP, or CONS are significant. However, 
when entered as logs, the coefficients on COMMIT,  PREMP,  and CONS are all 
significant and of  the expected sign. The finding of a negative and significant 
coefficient on COMMIT in the (logs) exclusion equation,  and the absence of 
such a finding for any of the escape-clause equations, suggests that the differ- 
ent degree of  policy  commitment  across the two decision-making  environ- 
ments may  indeed have a measurable  impact on the determination of  trade 
policy. Clearly, however, this conclusion is sensitive to the specification of  our 
estimating equation. 
To get a better sense of  what the data is telling us, we return to equations 
(40)  and (41) and note that an additional implication of the model of section 
1.3 is that the wage level should enter negatively in the determination of the 
tariff response under commitment (through the wage bill WNy)  but should be 
absent under discretion (except possibly through the shock measure).  Intui- 
tively, all else equal, a higher wage reflects a higher marginal product of labor, 
and thus a higher elasticity of  output with respect to employment, which re- 
duces the tariff response under commitment but not in its absence. In fact, a 37  Rules vs. Discretion in Trade Policy 
comparison of (40) and (41) confirms that the wage level is the only additional 
information entering into the determination of  the equilibrium tariff  under 
commitment which is not present under discretion. Moreover, replacing the 
variable COMMIT with the wage level should have little effect on coefficient 
estimates in the escape-clause equation but should make of indeterminant sign 
the coefficients on PREMP and CONS in  the exclusion equation, since by  (41) 
the total effect of a change in Ny  on t (both directly and indirectly through 9y) 
is composed of two effects of opposite sign, and similarly for PCy. In sum- 
mary, denoting as WAGE the production-worker wage, (40) and (41) imply 
(0)  (+I  (-1 
td = td (WAGE, PREMP,  CONS,.), 
(-1  (‘3  (?) 
tC = tc (WAGE, PREMP, CONS,.). 
Thus, estimating an equation of the form 
(43)  t = p, + p2(~y/~  + p3(~ycy/o  + p,(wy)  + p,r  + E, 
we expect to find the coefficient on WAGE insignificantly different from zero 
and little change in the other coefficients for the escape-clause equation, and a 
significantly negative coefficient on WAGE for the exclusion equation, with the 
coefficients on PREMP and CONS of indeterminant sign. Note also that the hy- 
pothesized relationship between the wage level and the tariff response is dis- 
tinct from that which comes out of the “social change” model of tariff deter- 
mination  (Ball  1967),  since this  political  model  would  imply  that  WAGE 
should be negatively related to tariff  responses in both the escape-clause and 
Tokyo Round exclusion equations (reflecting the hypothesized desire to bring 
about a more egalitarian income distribution rather than simply aiming to pre- 
serve the status quo), while our model suggests that it  should only appear 
negatively in the latter. 
The last columns of tables 1.2 and 1.3 present the results of  estimation of 
equation (43) for the escape-clause and the Tokyo Round exclusions. For each 
equation, only the results under a level specification are reported, since the 
log specification contains no  additional information over the regression of 
table 1.3 (when all variables are measured in logs, eq. [43] is just a rearrange- 
ment of eq. [42]). The results conform to the model’s predictions, and rein- 
force the tentative conclusions drawn from the previous regressions. The coef- 
ficient on WAGE in the escape-clause equation is never significant, and leaves 
the performance of the equation largely unaffected. In contrast, the coefficient 
on WAGE in the Tokyo Round exclusion equation is always significant and of 
the expected sign and, as expected, the coefficients on  PREMP and CONS be- 
come insignificantly different from zero. Combined with the results presented 
in the previous regressions, we view these results as generally pointing to the 
empirical importance of the degree of government discretion in the determi- 
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1.7  Conclusions 
The debate on rules versus discretion has received a great deal of  attention 
in the theory of  economic policy,  in  macroeconomics, public  finance,  and 
trade  policy,  But  the existing literature  has focused  almost  exclusively  on 
theoretical aspects of this debate. To date there has been little empirical study 
of  how relevant the distinction between rules and discretion is in the real world 
and no study within the context of trade policy. 
Trade policy lends itself particularly  well to an empirical investigation of 
these issues,  for two reasons.  First, as developed in section  1.3, the theory 
yields very sharp predictions of  how trade policy chosen under discretion dif- 
fers from that chosen under rules. Second, and perhaps more important, trade 
policy in the United States is implemented under a variety of institutional ar- 
rangements.  A major difference between some of these arrangements  is the 
commitment technologies  that they provide.  Hence, by comparing the poli- 
cies  implemented  within  these  different  environments,  one  can  examine 
whether or not the capacity to undertake binding policy commitments matters. 
We have attempted to do  just that by comparing trade policy actions taken 
in the highly discretionary environment of escape-clause decisions with those 
taken under less discretion within the context of the Tokyo Round. While our 
empirical results are far from conclusive,  they are at least suggestive that the 
degree of discretion matters in trade policy decisions. Perhaps more impor- 
tantly, our results signal the need for further empirical work before one can 
conclude with confidence that the degree of discretion does-or  that it does 
not-matter  in the determination of trade policy. 
Data Appendix 
This appendix defines the variables and describes the data sources underlying 
our reported empirical results.  We do not include sources for those variables 
(e.g., certain political variables) which we experimented with but did not re- 
port.  All the independent  variables were constructed from data contained in 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Trade and Immigration 
Data Set. This is an annual data set covering  four-digit SIC manufacturing 
industries from 1958 through 1985. 
All independent variables in the Tokyo Round regressions were constructed 
using  1978 values,  except for the four-firm  concentration  ratio  which  was 
available only for 1976. All independent variables for the escape clause re- 
gressions were taken  from the four-digit  industry  (or industries)  associated 
with the petition,  with the year being that associated with the month fifteen 
months prior to the ITC ruling date. Where a single petition spanned several 
four-digit  SIC industries, we treated  each four-digit  industry  as a separate 39  Rules vs. Discretion in Trade Policy 
presidential decision on the grounds that the president did often distinguish 
among industries or products of  a given petition in the final escape-clause 
determination (e.g., Color TV [TA-201-19] and Non-Electric Cookware [TA- 
201-391).  The rule for choosing the year associated with each escape clause 
petition reflects our attempt to generate preshock variables and leads to inde- 
pendent variables that are measured generally one to two years prior to the 
year of the ITC ruling. We  experimented with other rules, with no change in 
the results. The one exception to this rule was the four-firm concentration 
ratio which, as noted, was only available for 1976. 
The dependent variables for the Tokyo Round regressions were constructed 
from World Bank data supplied to us by Kishore Gawande and Daniel Trefler. 
The exclusions from the Swiss rule cuts were constructed by  beginning with 
line-item changes and aggregating up to the four-digit SIC level using 1980 
U.S. trade weights. The dependent variable for the escape-clause regressions 
was constructed by assigning a zero to presidential decisions which ended in 
no action or expedited adjustment assistance procedures, and a one otherwise. 










REP20  1 : 
ratio of production worker payroll to consumption (CONS) 
average production worker wage, deflated by CPI 
ratio  of  production  worker  employment to  total  production 
worker employment in U.S. manufacturing sector 
ratio of shipments minus net exports to GNP 
ratio of value added to shipments 
ratio of imports to consumption (CONS) 
average employment per establishment 
four-firm concentration ratio for 1976 
annual percentage change in IMPEN or WAGE 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if a president has con- 
sidered an escape-clause petition from the industry before, and 
zero otherwise 
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Comment  Richard H. Clarida 
I enjoyed and learned from this paper, even though I think the best parts are 
too short and some nice implications are left out. The authors are to be com- 
mended for their empirical strategy; I think they make exactly the right choice 
by employing exclusion restrictions to test their theory. The authors are also 
to be congratulated for explicitly incorporating distribution effects into their 
1987 model. Before I comment in more detail on these two main parts of the 
paper, let me first discuss the role of discretionary trade policy in an economy 
in which ex post supply elasticities differ from ex ante supply elasticities, and 
in which tariffs are the only instrument available to the policymaker. 
Richard H. Clarida is assistant professor of economics at Columbia University and a research 
associate at the National Bureau of  Economic Research. 41  Rules vs. Discretion in Trade Policy 
As outlined in section 1.2 of the paper, because under discretion the gov- 
ernment moves after supply has responded to any expected tariff, the optimal 
discretionary policy ignores the ex ante supply elasticity to the expected tar- 
iffs. When there are only production distortions, the optimal equilibrium- 
time-consistent-tariff  is increasing in  the ex post  supply elasticity: if  the 
technology is putty-clay, the equilibrium tariff is zero, while if  the technology 
is putty-putty, the equilibrium tariff is positive and equates the marginal ben- 
efit of reducing the production distortion with the marginal cost of distorting 
consumption. When there are consumption distortions, the optimal tariff  is 
decreasing in the ex post supply elasticity. If the technology is putty-clay, the 
optimal time-consistent tariff ignores the induced distortion in production and 
is set to eliminate the consumption distortion. If the technology is putty-putty, 
the optimal time-consistent tariff is lower because the marginal benefit of re- 
ducing the consumption distortion must be equated to the marginal cost of the 
induced distortion in production. Note that there is no presumption that tariffs 
set under discretion-a  putty-clay world in which firms “move first”-will 
be higher than under commitment-a  putty-putty world in which firms can 
fully adjust factor proportions after the policymaker’s “move.” 
I  now  turn to the authors’ two-sector model of  trade policy as a tool of 
income redistribution. In  this model-which  is a generalization of  the au- 
thors’ 1987 paper-the  cost of changing sectors differs among workers in the 
import-competing sector. A fall in the price of  imports redistributes income 
away from workers who are stuck in the import sector to workers in the export 
sector. Because workers differ in their cost of changing sectors, trade policy 
can influence the wage differential between sectors. The policymaker selects 
the tariff to maximize a social welfare function that weighs the utility of work- 
ers by their population share. There are three types of workers: workers in the 
export sector who stay there; workers in the import sector who shift to the 
export  sector; and  high-adjustment-cost workers  who  are stuck in  import 
sector. 
The optimal tariff-and  thus income redistribution-depends  of course on 
whether the policymaker has discretion in setting the tariff. If the tariff  is set 
after workers have chosen their sector of  employment, the optimal tariff is 
increasing in the share of employment in the import sector, increasing in the 
magnitude of the terms of trade shock, and decreasing in the share of expend- 
iture that falls on the import competing good. Under discretion, the tariff  is 
not influenced by the induced production distortion as measured by the share 
of wages in the total output of the import competing good. By contrast, under 
commitment, the larger the share of  wages in total output, the larger is the 
production distortion induced by  redistribution and, thus, the smaller is the 
tariff. Indeed,  strictly speaking, the theory predicts that given the share of 
employment in the import sector, the magnitude of the terms of trade shock, 
and the share of  expenditure that falls on the import competing good, the 
difference between the optimal tariff  under discretion and commitment de- 42  Robert W.  Staiger and Guido Tabellini 
pends entirely on the magnitude of  the production distortion as measured by 
the share of wages in the total output of  the import competing good. Thus, 
because the policymaker’s objective is to redistribute income to injured work- 
ers, the optimal tariff is larger under discretion than under commitment, be- 
cause the induced production distortions are ignored under the former regime. 
This result provides a key restriction that is sufficient to distinguish between 
a tariff set under commitment from a tariff set with discretion. Under commit- 
ment, the magnitude of the production distortion induced by a tariff should be 
negatively correlated with the level of the tariff once the influence of the share 
of  employment in  the  import  sector,  the  magnitude  of  the  terms  of  trade 
shock, and the share of expenditure that falls on the import competing good 
are taken  into account.  By contrast,  the level of a tariff  set with discretion 
should be uncorrelated with the magnitude of the induced production distor- 
tion once employment,  the size of the shock, and the induced consumption 
distortion are taken into account. This exclusion restriction provides the basis 
for the authors’ empirical work. In my view, this is a real contribution of the 
paper because  it allows for a  simple test  of the proposition  that  discretion 
matters in the setting of trade policy. In a regime such as the Tokyo Round of 
the GATT in which tariffs-and  their exclusions-are  negotiated over a num- 
ber of years in advance of their implementation, and largely in advance of any 
private  sector resource flows that occur as a result,  an optimal tariff should 
incorporate the production  distortion  that  will be  induced.  By contrast,  the 
granting of escape clause  (section 201) relief occurs only after a finding of 
injury to an import competing  sector has been established by  the  ITC and 
thus, so it is postulated,  after the bulk of factor supply decisions have been 
made. In such a regime, the “optimal” granting of escape-clause relief should 
not take into account the magnitude of the production distortion that has been 
induced by the expectation of the granting of the relief! 
I must say that, while I applauded the elegance of this test, before reading 
section 1.6 of the paper I was skeptical that the outcome of such an empirical 
exercise would support the restriction that the share of wages in output does 
not enter significantly in the granting of  section 201 relief, and that the wage 
share enters negatively in an equation predicting size of Tokyo Round exclu- 
sions. The empirical work has changed these priors, at least to some extent. 
As reported  in table  1.2, when the  share of  wages is excluded from probit 
equations for predicting  escape-clause  decisions,  the employment and con- 
sumption variables enter with the expected signs-positive  and negative, re- 
spectively-are  usually significant. When the wage share is included  in the 
equations,  nothing except the political dummy variables  is significant.  The 
results for the Tokyo Round exclusion equations are somewhat more support- 
ive of the theory. To my surprise, the wage variable enters negatively in three 
of the  four specifications,  and is even statistically significant  in one. In all 
equations the employment and consumption variables enter with the “correct” 43  Rules vs. Discretion in Trade Policy 
signs, and all three variables are statistically significant in one of the specifi- 
cations (eq. [2] in table 1.3). 
To sum up, this is a good paper. It develops an interesting theoretical model 
that is used to devise an elegant test of the role of discretion in the granting of 
protection. It applies this test to data sets that, certainly based on my  priors, 
could have been expected to reject the predictions of the theory. I was sur- 
prised that a variable that acts as a proxy for the magnitude of the consumption 
distortion generally enters with a negative coefficient, since the conventional 
wisdom is that those who grant protection usually ignore the “hidden” costs 
that such protection imposes on consumers. My one particular complaint with 
the empirical work is that I would have liked to see all of the equations run 
sans the political dummy variables. If  the results depend on any particular 
choice of dummies, this should be reported specifically. I will close with the 
following observation. It is often argued-sometimes  by  me-that  presiden- 
tial discretion in the granting of protection is valuable because a president is 
much less subject to the rent seeking of firms and workers from one particular 
state or industry than are the congressional committee chairmen who would 
be expected to draft the “rules of the game” in any regime in which the presi- 
dent’s discretion is diminished. This argument overlooks the fact, documented 
nicely in this paper, that there is a cost to discretion, in that social welfare can 
be enhanced if policymakers can make binding commitments. Thus, it is not 
at all clear that costly discretion dominates a rules regime in which the rules 
are subject to rent seeking. 
Comment  Michael 0.  Moore 
Robert W.  Staiger and Guido Tabellini attempt in this paper to evaluate empir- 
ically the role of discretion in trade policy outcomes. The project is based on 
a generalization of theoretical work they have developed elsewhere.  The gen- 
eralization, like the earlier research, is insightful. Their attempts to test the 
theory empirically are more problematic, however. 
The theoretical construct is offered as an alternative to political economy 
models to explain the existence of suboptimal tariff rates. The critical result is 
that a benevolent government with discretion will impose higher (and nonop- 
timal) tariffs than  those  in  a  regime of  precommitment  because  of  time- 
consistency problems. This prediction is also consistent with lobbying models 
in the political economy tradition; the more discretion vote-seeking politicians 
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have, the more likely they might be influenced by  lobbying efforts. In  this 
sense, the general predictions of this model and lobbying models may not be 
empirically distinguishable from one another. This makes estimation based 
explicitly on a theoretical model all the more useful. Fortunately, the authors’ 
model has an implication that a particular form of supply response will influ- 
ence tariffs in a regime of commitment. There is no equivalent prediction from 
lobbying models of which I am aware. Consequently, testing for such supply 
responses has significant potential, not only in determining whether commit- 
ment matters in general but also whether this particular type, rather than polit- 
ical commitment, explains trade policy. 
The authors go on to argue that a benevolent redistributionist government 
would prefer commitment because it yields lower tariffs and higher social wel- 
fare but is unable to do so because this policy is time-inconsistent. This seems 
at odds (at least on a casual basis) with many recent trade policy “reforms.” 
Congress has moved to remove discretion from the hands of the president and 
the U.S. Trade Representative, most notably in the “Super 301” provisions of 
the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act. This change may have been instituted to force 
the government to precommit to lower tariffs but I have my doubts. Rather, it 
seems to be either a “backdoor” means of  obtaining protection or perhaps a 
way  to force market access through a commitment to retaliatory import re- 
strictions. 
Thi;  brings up a more general issue. The degree of discretion and commit- 
ment available to the government is not entirely exogenous. In  the United 
States, Congress can choose how much trade policy authority to delegate and, 
moreover, how much it should tie its own hands. Naturally, one can argue that 
a unilateral announcement by  Congress that trade policy will be nondiscre- 
tionary may not be credible in a final equilibrium. However, until the laws are 
changed, the government may have very little leeway in making decisions. 
Important examples of this include U. S. antidumping and countervailing-duty 
procedures. A more general theory (though clearly not the intent of this paper) 
might help explain why the “government” chooses to precommit in some pol- 
icy areas but retain discretion in others. A related issue is why would some 
industries  pursue  protection through  the escape clause and  others through 
GATT-round exclusions. If  firms can choose between them, why would any 
industry ever seek protection through a process where there is commitment, 
since, according to Staiger and Tabellini’s model, they would receive lower 
tariffs.* 
In the empirical section, Staiger and Tabellini use the results of their model 
along with  assumptions about specific functional forms to derive estimable 
equations. They then estimate parameters for two policy outcomes, distin- 
2. Insight into this issue may be found in M. Moore and S. Suranovic, “Lobbying vs. Admin- 
istered Protection: Endogenous Industry Choice and National Welfare,” Journal of  lnternarional 
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guished primarily, they argue, by the degree of commitment. While this at- 
tempt is welcome (few political economy models have yielded specific equa- 
tions to be estimated), the implementation has certain difficulties. 
For example, the models derived from the theory involve the natural logs 
of both t/(  1 + t) and the explanatory variables. Since the major advantage of 
theory-based econometrics involves the derivation of  specific relationships, 
the use of the level oft  as the dependent variable is troubling. 
The focus of the study is on the predictive power of supply-side responses 
in explaining tariff rates. The variable derived from theory, llq” + uyw,  was 
unavailable because of data problems with q”.  Two alternative measures were 
proposed: uyw = wyNy/PYCy  and wy.  Some difficulties clearly arise in how to 
interpret the estimates associated with these “instrumental” variables. Discus- 
sion about the nature of the resulting bias would be useful. 
The optimal tariff for both discretion and commitment depends positively 
on (1 - a’)  = (w -  wy)/w,  where w  is the average wage rate. For industries 
with low wages, the optimal tariff  is positive. Thus, this model provides an 
alternative to equity-concern models for why low-wage workers receive high 
 tariff^.^ This formulation also means that higher-than-average industry wage 
rates should lead to a negative optimal tariff. Given that some of  the U.S.’s 
most protected industries have high wages (the auto and steel industries, for 
example), some interpretation of this result would be appropriate. 
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the empirical work involves the data 
used in the escape clause analysis. The authors choose to use four-digit level 
SIC data for explaining these outcomes. This seems inappropriate given that 
the  industries must  offer the  International Trade  Commission (ITC) much 
more disaggregated data in support of their petition. Use of this publicly avail- 
able data might be much more helpful in prediction. 
The authors have chosen two processes characterized by differing levels of 
precommitment. However, there are many other differences in these two pro- 
cedures, involving different institutions and decision-makers. Consequently, 
one should be careful in assigning all differences in the empirical results to 
precommitment. One way to avoid this would be to analyze an alternative pair 
of  trade policy  outcomes,  in particular the ITC  decisions in  antidumping/ 
countervailing duty cases and ITC escape clause decisions. In the former, con- 
siderable precommitment is apparent. If the ITC rules affirmatively (assuming 
a positive dumping or subsidy margin), the result is either a duty, a price- 
undertaking, or a VER-type arrangement. An  industry with  a “good’ case 
may feel confident that some protection will be forthcoming. With the escape 
clause decision, the ITC makes a serious injury ruling but does not commit 
3. For the traditional reasoning, see N. Fielke, “The Tariff Structure for Manufacturing Indus- 
tries in the United States: A Test of Some Traditional Explanations,” Columbia Journal of  World 
Business  11, no. 4 (Winter 1976): 98-104;  and R. E. Baldwin, The Political Economy of  U.S. 
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the government to any action; the president makes the final decision. This pair 
of decisions has three advantages: (a)  the same dependent variable would be 
used, (b)  the same institution is making the decision (the only difference then 
would  be the level  of  commitment),  and  (c) similar  explanatory  variables 
would be available. 
Staiger and Tabellini  have made a useful contribution  in this paper, most 
importantly by deriving equations from theory to test for the importance of 
discretion. The particular implementation strategy has problems, in large part 
because of data availability. The final results would be more persuasive if they 
took  advantage  of  available  ITC data sets. Finally,  other pairs  of  policies 
might be more appropriate for resolving whether commitment plays an impor- 
tant role in trade outcomes. 